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THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AS AN INSTITUTION:
ON UNCERTAINTY AND POLICY LEVERS
S. Jay Plager *
In this essay I address a central concern that runs through a
number of the papers presented at this symposium, and is attributed,
at least in some measure, to the Federal Circuit in its institutional
role: the endemic problem of uncertainty in law and the judicial
decisional process, and particularly in patent law. Though thought by
some to be present in various aspects of Federal Circuit
jurisprudence,' the exemplar of the uncertainty problem is the court's
handling of patent claim construction-a jurisprudential conundrum
created by the pervasiveness of ambiguous patent claims. Part I of
this essay discusses this uncertainty problem.
A second concern, the subject of several recent books about the
Federal Circuit's performance as a patent law institution, is how the
Federal Circuit has used, or failed to use, the "policy levers"
available to it to deal with various patent law problems, including the
uncertainty problem. In Part III of this essay, I reprise that portion of
my keynote address at the symposium in which I presented a
hypothetical litigation brought by the authors of these works against
the key government actors in the patent system. I examine what a
judicial response in terms of policy levers might look like.
I. INTRODUCTION
I begin with a brief overview of the institutional role of the
Federal Circuit as compared to her sister circuits in the courts of the
* Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This is a revised and
expanded version of the keynote address given by Judge Plager at Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review's symposium, The Federal Circuit as an Institution, on October 30, 2009. Judge Plager
expresses his appreciation to his law clerk, Lynne Pettigrew, for her invaluable assistance in the
preparation of this essay.
1. See Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1161, 1163 (2010) ("'[T]he Federal Circuit does a coin flip and reverses district court decisions
left and right. You might as well just roll the dice."' (quoting Patent Troubles: Does the Patent
System Need Fixing?, COP. LEGAL TIMES, June 2005, at 61)).
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United States. Following this overview are some comments about the
articles that appear in this symposium issue.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
shares the same place in the three-level hierarchy of the Article III
American judicial system as the twelve other courts of appeals. The
court is governed in its membership, structure, and activities by the
same body of constitutional law, statutory law, and rules of
procedure as are the other circuits.
Yet the Federal Circuit differs from the other circuits in two
significant respects. First, the Federal Circuit does not have the
general jurisdiction that the other circuits share over the panoply of
federal criminal and civil causes, but instead has a variety of specific
subject-matter areas assigned to it. Within these specific subject-
matter areas, the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
Second, the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit is not geographically
limited, as are the jurisdictions of the other circuits, but instead is
nationwide with regard to the areas over which its jurisdiction
extends.2
One subject-matter area Congress has assigned to the Federal
Circuit is patent law. Indeed, the history of the Federal Circuit-
created by Congress in 1982-is intimately tied to a perceived need
(perceived especially by the then-practitioners of patent law and the
innovation and entrepreneurial community most affected by patents)
for change in the way the circuit courts had previously approached
that body of law.4 The increasing role in the economy that patents
have filled in the past twenty-five or so years has vindicated the
views of those who perceived a need for change.
It is not surprising, then, that when the conversation turns to the
Federal Circuit, it turns to patent law, at least within this subset of
the legal and academic community. And when it turns to patent law,
it turns to the question of why, given its exclusive jurisdiction and
virtually free hand over patent doctrine, the changes the Federal
2. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is considered a regional
circuit for general jurisdiction purposes, but also has specific subject matter areas with national
reach, particularly in the area of administrative law.
3. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
4. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1989); S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts ofAppeals, the Federal
Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39
AM. U. L. REv. 853, 854-55 (1990).
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Circuit has brought about in patent law and doctrine have not done
more to solve some of the issues that bedevil the patent system.
The articles submitted for this symposium speak, in thoughtful
ways and often with valuable empirical data, to a number of these
issues.5 In the interest of time and the reader's patience, I will not
discuss in detail each of the symposium articles. However, the reader
will benefit from reading them all as each author has something
important to say about the patent system and the role of the Federal
Circuit as an institution.
Several of the papers address particular aspects of the court's
jurisprudence. For example, Professor David McGowan explores the
doctrine of inequitable conduct in patent law and how the court has
moved in recent years to cabin the doctrine, with consequences for
predictability and certainty that he believes can be improved upon.'
Professor Jeffrey Lefstin reassesses the early patent jurisprudence of
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), one of the Federal
Circuit's predecessor courts. Professor Lefstin argues that when the
CCPA's precedents were incorporated wholesale into the law of the
Federal Circuit, so were the jurisprudential outlook and methodology
the CCPA had developed.' He suggests that the outlook and
methodology may have served the CCPA well as overseer of the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), but may not serve so
well the very different needs of the Federal Circuit.'
Other articles take a global look at the Federal Circuit. Professor
Christopher Cotropia explores the occasionally heard accusation that
the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases causes
the court's decision making to become stagnant and entrenched, and
negatively affects the pace of doctrinal development. Based on the
empirical data he has compiled regarding the several circuit courts of
appeals, he concludes to the contrary: "[T]he data suggest that the
5. On the uses and values of empirical data, see S. Jay Plager, Keynote Address at the
North Carolina Law Review Symposium: Frontiers in Empirical Patent Law Scholarship (Oct. 23,
2008), in 87 N.C. L. REv. 1323 (2009).
6. David McGowan, Inequitable Conduct, 43 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 945, 946 (2010). At this
writing, the announced en banc review of our inequitable conduct jurisprudence remains pending.
See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., No. 2008-1511, 2010 WL 1655391, at *1 (Fed.
Cir. Apr. 26, 2010) (order granting petition for rehearing en banc).
7. Jeffrey Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit's Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843, 847
(2010).
8. Id.
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Federal Circuit is no more lacking in jurisprudential diversity than
other circuits and, considering dissents, is significantly more
internally diverse in viewpoints regarding the outcomes of individual
cases."9 Donald Dunner, a long-time practitioner and leading
advocate before the court, shares that positive outlook on the court's
place in the patent system and its institutional performance. 1o
Professor Polk Wagner's The Two Federal Circuits takes a
somewhat different tack. He argues that the problem the Federal
Circuit confronts is choosing between its role as "decider" of cases,
and its role as "manager" of the jurisprudence. Though that duality of
roles exists in all appellate courts, he sees it as a particularly acute
issue for the Federal Circuit. "
Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss, whose earlier work provided some
of the basis for the Wagner thesis, disagrees with both Cotropia and
Wagner. She contends that Cotropia's approach is denial (the
empirical data do not rule out quality concerns), while the Wagner
approach is apologetic (the concerns regarding the court are not
excused by the court's conflicting goals). 12
Professor Lee Petherbridge's article addresses the development
of patent law and posits a theoretical framework for the operational
aspects of patent law. Although not focused on the uncertainty issues
which I address in Part II below, his article illuminates nicely those
issues, as well as the issues he addresses-doctrines of patentability
and patent scope. " He first posits a fairly conventional view of
patent law as a system for creating certain property rights that
provide a number of discrete incentives for innovation.14 Regarding
the issues with which I am concerned, he usefully emphasizes the
importance of clarity and that "more predictable rights can make
innovation more efficient." "
9. Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining Unformity Within the Federal Circuit by
Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 804 (2010).
10. Donald R. Dunner, The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Its Critical Role
in the Revitalization of US. Patent Jurisprudence, Past, Present, and Future, 43 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 775, 783 (2010).
11. R. Polk Wagner, The Two Federal Circuits, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 785, 787 (2010).
12. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an Institution: What Ought We to
Expect?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 827, 830-31 (2010).
13. Lee Petherbridge, On the Development of Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 893, 896
(2010).
14. Id. at 906.
15. Id. at 899.
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His second theoretical construct is especially illuminating,
though possibly more arguable. He calls it a theory of the patent
granting process."1 Under this theory, the USPTO's role in the
examination of a patent application is viewed as "nothing more than
'a rough "first cut" at determining [patent] validity.""" Professor
Petherbridge seems to suggest that this is the way it was intended to
be, but the important question is whether this is an accurate
description of the actual operational effect of the process.
Under Professor Petherbridge's theory, it would follow that the
USPTO would allow a nontrivial number of claims directed to
inventions that are unpatentable and would reject a nontrivial number
of claims that are (or should be) patentable. 8 It also follows that it is
the courts that "are tasked with determining the legal scope of the
rights conferred by patent claims and with determining whether
accused products and processes infringe those rights."l 9 That may
indeed be an accurate description of what courts now do. What may
be different from the usual normative description of the
USPTO/court interaction is the expectation that what the USPTO
does is only a first pass at the basic questions posed by the statutory
requirements for a patent, and that the real gatekeepers are the courts.
Professor Petherbridge suggests that such a view of the system
implies important consequences in terms of the economics of the
system and its social costs, and of the incentives to draft patent
applications that obscure the scope of the invention at issue.20 He
also suggests why the USPTO has strong incentives to cooperate
with this patenting strategy. His thesis provides an interesting
perspective on the two questions I mentioned earlier and will explore
next: legal uncertainty in patent law generally, and ambiguity in
patent claiming and the problems that poses for patent claim
construction. Other articles included in this symposium issue will be
discussed in the context of these two questions.
16. Id. at 900.
17. Id. at 901 (quoting ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY
1046-47 (4th ed. 2007)).
18. Id. at 901.
19. Id. at 900.
20. Id. at 902.
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II. THE UNCERTAINTY CONUNDRUM
A. Uncertainty in Patent Law In General
I have had long-standing concerns with the problem of
indeterminacy in legal doctrine, especially in patent law. 2' Professor
Kelly Casey Mullally has written an insightful article on this issue.2 2
Rather than the oft-repeated generalities recited about doctrinal
indeterminacy in patent law,23 she focuses attention on the specific
causes of that uncertainty and some of the solutions. She begins with
the unarguable proposition that indeterminacy can undermine
fundamental goals of the patent system by reducing incentives for
creators to invent and to publicly disclose their inventions-a point
that has not escaped our court.2 4 She notes that the Federal Circuit is
one of the accused sources of this uncertainty, allegedly by being
unable to render patent law decisions that are certain and
predictable.2 5
She explores two aspects of the uncertainty problem: (1) the
uncertainty that results from the structure and institutional behaviors
of the public entities involved; and (2) the uncertainty that results
from private actors in the system. Her article contains insights into
why uncertainty is inherent in all judicial processes-in any given
circumstance a court may find that there is no legal rule to apply, or
the legal rule may be unclear, or there may be competing legal rules.
Then there is the process of reconciling conflicting precedents, the
application of stare decisis and balancing tests, and equitable
considerations. Mullally takes note of an underlying tendency among
judges: "Courts often reject precision in, and categorization of, legal
concepts in resolving disputes of all kinds." 26
In a seminal work in the field of judicial decision making, Karl
Llewellyn, in his book The Common Law Tradition-Deciding
Appeals, showed that for many so-called controlling judicial canons
21. See S. Jay Plager, Challenges for Intellectual Property Law in the Twenty-First Century:
Indeterminacy and Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 69.
22. Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)Certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1109,1109 (2010).
23. Id. at 1120 ("[M]any of the demands for certainty in patent law have been vague,
conclusory, and fatalistic.").
24. Id. at 1135.
25. Id. at 1114.
26. Id. at 1116.
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of interpretation upon which decisions can be based, there often are
canons of equal stature that call for an opposite conclusion.2 7
Llewellyn, an early legal realist, posited that "the ideal is not
'certainty' at all, in any of the senses in which that term is commonly
applied to matters legal. The true ideal is reasonable regularity of
decision."28 In essence, Professors Llewellyn and Mullally
acknowledge why what judges do is called "judging."
With regard specifically to uncertainty in patent law, Professor
Mullally notes the pressure from the USPTO and the district courts
for greater formalism-more bright-line rules-and the opposite
pressure from the U.S. Supreme Court for more flexible standards
and less formalism. 29 In addition, she notes various factors in the
patent system that affect certainty, including-echoing Professor
Petherbridge's observation-strong incentives for patentees to
deliberately introduce uncertainties into their patents. 30
Her article provides detailed support for her call for more
focused analysis: "Systematic analysis of the sources of legal
uncertainty and their specific impact, along with targeted solutions,
have the potential to impart important lessons for private and public
actors in patent law."" She offers what she calls a "general
framework" for addressing uncertainty: identify the primary source
of uncertainty that we wish to redress; then, the desired type of
certainty should inform the direction of proposed changes; and
finally, in striving for greater certainty, consider the importance of
other countervailing values. 32 She illustrates her analysis with several
specific proposals for reform. These include recognizing the value in
some circumstances of bright-line rules; addressing district courts'
lack of technical expertise; and adjusting the claim definiteness
requirement, perhaps by shifting the burden to the patentee to prove
27. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 521-35
(1960) (describing "thrust but parry" and "thrust and counterthrust" canons of construction).
28. Id. at 216.
29. Mullally, supra note 22, at 1130 ("Indeed, recent Supreme Court opinions on issues that
do not relate solely to patents demonstrate a marked preference for flexible standards in patent
law."). The Supreme Court has recently confirmed Mullally's observation. See Bilski v. Kappos,
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226-27 (2010) (rejecting the "machine-or-transformation" test as the exclusive
test for patent eligibility of a process under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
30. Mullally, supra note 22, at 1135-36 ("[C]ommentators have observed that patents are
becoming more unclear and their meanings more uncertain.").
31. Id. at 1159.
32. Id.
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that the claim is definite or by simply construing the claim against
the patentee.33
B. Uncertainty in Patent Claim Construction
Professor Mullally's last example speaks to what is probably the
most talked about area of legal uncertainty in patent law today: claim
construction-the process of judicially determining exactly what the
inventor invented, or more accurately, exactly what the issued patent
states as the invention. Several articles addressing that process were
presented at the symposium. Professor David Schwartz reports new
data on the Federal Circuit's reversal rate in claim construction
cases-that is, the rate at which trial court claim constructions are
reversed by the Federal Circuit on appeal.34 The new data are from
just before the decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 3
through the end of 2008. Professor Schwartz is among the leading
researchers in empirical studies of patent law claim construction
reversal rates. 36
Much has been made in recent years of the Federal Circuit's
reversal rate in patent claim construction cases. Though views vary
widely concerning exactly what that rate is and what causes it, the
consensus is that it is too high, and therefore troubling." As to what
the rate actually is, some of the confusion is inherent in the actual
data. For example, Professor Schwartz, in trying to compare de novo
review cases (i.e., no deference given to the trial court's view) with
cases acknowledging some level of deference, notes that there are
over thirty pre-Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc. " cases that
omit any mention of whether review was de novo or with some
33. Id. at 1128, 1147; see also JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE:
How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 239 (2008) (suggesting
that a claim that has more than one plausible interpretation is invalid for indefiniteness).
34. David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1091
(2010).
35. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
36. See David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International
Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1699 (2009); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes
Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 223 (2008).
37. See Richard S. Gruner, How High Is Too High?: Reflections on the Sources and
Meaning of Claim Construction Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981,
984 & nn.1-2 (2010).
38. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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deference (i.e., it was impossible to ascertain from the opinions
which standard applied). 3
With regard to the cause of the troubling reversal rate, the blame
is most often laid directly at the door of the Federal Circuit. The
court is accused, basically, of not having claim construction
standards that are clear and understandable, and of not applying the
standards, such as they are, consistently. The court's much-
anticipated decision in Phillips v. A WH Corp.,40 which was expected
to state definitively the interpretive standards to be applied in claim
construction cases, and thus reverse the need for reversals, does not
seem to have turned the tide. If anything, the reversal rate has not
decreased." Professor Schwartz repeats the generally held view that
the "claim construction reversal rate is unduly high."42
Do the claim construction reversal rates-the frequency with
which district court judges' claim constructions are "corrected" on
appeal-really indicate that there is a serious problem in the system,
and particularly with the standards mandated by the Federal Circuit
for claim interpretation? Professor Richard S. Gruner challenges that
conclusion. In a lengthy and thought-provoking study titled How
High Is Too High?: Reflections on the Sources and Meaning of
Claim Construction Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, Professor
Gruner concludes that "the correct answer to the question posed by
this Article about whether present claim construction reversal rates
of the Federal Circuit are too high, is that these rates are substantial,
but of little meaning regarding patent system quality . . . ."43 He
opines that "[e]xcessive attention to these rates distracts us from
greater attention to the impact of Federal Circuit standards on extra-
judicial case resolutions . . . ."44 Professor Gruner concludes that
"current claim construction standards are doing just fine."45
In the face of the drumbeat of accusations surrounding the
institutional failure of the Federal Circuit to bring certainty to the
claim construction process, Professor Gruner's analysis and
39. Schwartz, supra note 34, at 1097.
40. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
41. Schwartz, supra note 34, at 1080-81.
42. Id. at 1107.
43. Gruner, supra note 37, at 1071.
44. Id. at 1072.
45. Id.
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conclusion is noteworthy. He supports his conclusion by arguing that
the cases reviewed and frequently reversed by the Federal Circuit are
"outliers, selectively filtered by the case settlement processes that
dominate patent litigation to ensure that only the most uncertain
claim construction cases reach the Federal Circuit."46 Gruner
explains that "[ajs they review cases with high claim construction
uncertainty, it is hardly surprising that district courts and Federal
Circuit judges see the intensely factual and highly technical issues
surrounding the meaning and construction of patent claims
differently.""
As an initial point, it is worth remembering why there are
patents with such highly uncertain claims in them, a point noted
earlier. There is general agreement, as noted in a number of the
articles in this symposium issue, that at the claim drafting stage a
patent applicant's goal is often to draw claims that are as ambiguous,
and therefore as uncertain, as possible. This is done in hopes of
having the claims cover any possibly implicated known or unknown
commercial activity that may exist now or may develop in the future,
or at least to have the claim language be broad enough to provide a
credible litigation threat to potential competitors. An additional
contributor to claim ambiguity, not necessarily intended, is that the
nature of inventions in some highly technical fields today may make
it difficult, if not virtually impossible, for anyone adequately to put
the particular invention into words, in a one-sentence claim, in a way
that makes the boundaries discernable.
One hindrance to the success of an intentional ambiguity by the
claim drafter is the USPTO's review of the proposed claim language
prior to approval of the patent application. However, for many of the
reasons noted by Professor Petherbridge, the current process has
shown itself all too often to be a non-obstacle. Whether recent
undertakings by the USPTO leadership will lead to significant
changes in the USPTO's review process and the outcomes of that
process remain to be seen.4
46. Id. at 985.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Request for Comments on Enhancement in the Quality of Patents, 74 Fed. Reg.
65,093, 65,093-65,100 (Dec. 9, 2009); David Kappos, Under Sec'y of Commerce for Intellectual
Prop. and Dir., USPTO, Remarks to AIPLA Annual Meeting (Oct. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2009/2009octl6.jsp.
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Another potential hindrance is the risk of a court subsequently
finding a too-loosely drawn claim invalid for indefiniteness. The
Patent Act requires that a patent specification conclude with one or
more claims "particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention."4 9 This is known
as the "definiteness" requirement. In determining whether that
standard has been met, the Federal Circuit does not usually consider
an ambiguous claim, whether deliberately drafted that way or not, to
be a violation of the standard. "[W]e have not held that a claim is
indefinite merely because it poses a difficult issue of claim
construction."" The claim must be, literally, "'not amenable to
construction' or 'insolubly ambiguous.""' One consequence of this
particular reading of the statute is that it removes a significant
impetus for clearer claim drafting, thus reinforcing the system's
tolerance for uncertainty in claims. In addition, and importantly for
the court, it opens the way for claim interpretation cases to come to
the court in which the claims at issue are so ambiguous that there are
a variety of possible understandings; yet, because some conclusion
about meaning is possible, the claim falls short of being "not
amenable to construction."52
Professor Gruner posits that much of this built-in ambiguity is
managed in the real world through economic behavior-competitors
negotiate for licenses when they think it worthwhile, engage in
mergers and acquisitions, or take into account the real costs of
litigation and potential recoveries and then engage in settlements
based on their likelihood of success in the face of uncertainties about
the scope and reach of the patents." While the doctrines explicated
by the court play a role here-negotiation occurs "in the shadow of
the law"-the ultimate resolutions of the disputes are not law-
governed.5 4
49. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
50. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
51. Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
52. For a recent critique of the Federal Circuit's indefiniteness jurisprudence, see Enzo
Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 605 F.3d 1347, 1347-49 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Plager, J., dissenting
from denial of petition for rehearing).
53. Gruner, supra note 37, at 1028.
54. This is not a new idea. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert,
Bargaining in the Shadow ofthe Law: The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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As a consequence, only a small percentage of patent disputes
ever actually get tried, and only a fraction of those survive to the
appeal stage. The result, as Professor Gruner sees it, is that when it
comes to the enforcement of a patent through actual litigation,
[u]nder these conditions the uncertainty and materially
different findings deemed plausible by the respective
parties, coupled with the ability of litigants to take clear (or
at least similarly perceived) cases out of the adjudicatory
system through settlements, the surprising question is not
why are Federal Circuit claim construction reversal rates so
high, but rather why these rates are not even higher."
This is a strikingly different thesis from that ordinarily heard,
and it challenges many of the standard explanations for why claim
construction cases are so difficult. Admittedly, not all claim
construction cases on appeal are all that difficult, or even all that
unclear. Sometimes the trial court judge arrives at a construction of
the disputed claim term that is as sensible under the circumstances as
can be found, and the case is a relatively easy affirmance. Sometimes
a trial court judge is overly impressed with a party's argument but
the resulting claim construction does not withstand close
examination, so that a reversal is unavoidable.
But there remains some number of cases that are-as Professor
Gruner describes-the outliers that involve claims that are so
ambiguously drafted that nothing in the patent clearly favors one
party over the other. In such circumstances, the decisional outcome
cannot be dictated pro forma. The notion that standard canons of
construction can be framed that would solve such cases is unrealistic:
Llewellyn rules. Simply put, these cases present interpretation
problems for which there are no "right" answers.
How then are such cases to be decided? Professor Llewellyn's
insights may again be useful: the court must make a judgment based
on the sense of the situation. 56 Llewellyn explains "situation-sense"
as the complex of law-situation-facts, coupled with "the felt duty to
justice which twins with the duty to the law."" Though Llewellyn's
insights are derived from his study of common law courts-and
55. Gruner, supra note 37, at 985.
56. LLEWELLYN, supra note 27, at 121-57.
57. Id. at 121.
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federal courts are not common law courts in the traditional sense-
the process of patent claim construction has many parallels: the
specifics at issue in any two cases are never the same, the doctrinal
rules invoked for decision are at best only guides, and the issues are
inevitably a blend of facts and law as well as context and technology.
Given all that, the question of why the reversal rate is what it is
may be considered by asking, whose situational sense should
prevail? Should it be the trial court judge who heard the witnesses
and spent days or even weeks with the case? How much does it
matter that, at least for some trial court judges, a patent case with a
difficult claim construction problem is seldom seen? " Or should the
sense of the situation be decided by the appellate court judges who,
working from a cold record with limited time, try their best to
understand what the parties and the trial court judge think about the
matter? The appellate court judges do have the advantage of seeing a
number of such patent claim construction cases on a regular basis,
but does their experience help them when addressing a particular
case?
To address the conundrum of who should have the final say in
claim construction there is no easy generalization that provides the
answer. It depends. It depends on the grasp of the problem conveyed
by the trial court judge, and the care taken in conveying that grasp. It
depends on how self-assured the appellate court judges who heard
the case are regarding the particular technology, especially in highly
complex, technical matters. And perhaps most importantly, it
depends on the appellate court judges, who, if nothing else, will have
the last word about the matter as between themselves and the trial
court judge. They may prefer their versions of good sense, or they
may feel some obligation to defer to the trial court judge when the
outcome is a matter of essential "judgment." However the judgments
may be articulated, however rationalized they may be in terms of the
carefully selected canons of claim construction, the outcomes on
appeal in these difficult claim construction cases ultimately depend
on the Federal Circuit's judgment about the sense of the situation.
Understood in this way, the surprising thing indeed is that the
58. For an earlier average estimate of how often trial judges hear patent cases, see Plager,
supra note 21, at 77.
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appellate court judges think that the trial court judges get these claim
construction cases "right" nearly two-thirds of the time. 5
Finally, I note the views expressed in Professor Ted Sichelman's
article regarding both the general topic of (un)certainty60 as
discussed by Professor Mullally and the specifics of claim
construction addressed by the Gruner thesis. Concerning the question
of legal uncertainty as it reflects on reversal rates, Professor
Sichelman notes that the average Federal Circuit reversal rates in
patent cases across all issues is essentially the same as the average
reversal rates for private civil litigation across the other circuit
courts. 61 It is the claim construction cases that skew the data, and
which he considers to be "a special animal deserving of reform."62
He agrees with Professor Gruner that the bulk of claim construction
disputes settle,63 and that some of the increase in claim construction
reversal rates relative to average rates for civil cases and other patent
issues is likely attributable to selection effects. However, he finds
that this explanation does not fully account for the increase; he also
attributes the increase to a complex of other factors, especially the
high costs of litigation."
Interestingly, Professor Sichelman recognizes, in the context of
patent law, Llewellyn's concept of conflicting canons: "[I]n its quest
for predictability, the Federal Circuit has adopted a number of
'canons' of claim construction, which-while seemingly
instantiating a formal regime of transparent rules-are internally
contradictory and rest on flawed premises."65 And he captures the
idea of situation sense as the decisional model in these outlier cases:
"[I]t appears that typically unstated judicial ideologies influence
judges, whether conspicuous or not, to choose one of the competing
canons in the cases in which they conflict." 66 He notes that by
"ideologies" he does not mean political ideologies, but rather a
59. See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 231, 241 tbl. 1 (2005).
60. See Sichelman, supra note 1, at 1163 n.3 (adopting the Mullally "mongrel term").
61. Id. at 1175 fig.1.
62. Id. at 1189.
63. He places the cases that effectively settle at 84 to 89 percent. Id. at 1180.
64. Id. at 1180-81.
65. Id. at 1191.
66. Id. at 1192.
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judge's view of the role of the patent system.67 He concludes this
discussion with a statement that resonates with the next part of this
essay: "[S]ince the differing 'rules' often lead to irreconcilable
results that can only be resolved by policy choices, the Federal
Circuit would provide more guidance-and, hence, more stability-
by explicitly considering such policies in its opinions, rather than
promulgating a fagade of formalism." 68
III. POLICY LEVERS
The recent books I mentioned at the beginning of this essay are
familiar to patent lawyers and academics-James Bessen and
Michael Meurer's Patent Failure,6' and Dan Burk and Mark
Lemley's Patent Crisis.70 There is another recent book by Michael
Heller worth noting, The Gridlock Economy,7" that points to the
problems caused by too many overlapping claims to ownership and
rights, including multiple patents dividing up interests in singular
innovations. 72
Having spent (or misspent) some twenty-five years of my
professional life as a law professor, I am not unsympathetic to the
efforts reflected in much of this literature. At the same time, in the
almost-equal number of years that I have been on the bench, I have
come to understand that the vision of what judges do, and even more
importantly do not do, as seen by the academic community differs in
significant ways from the basic judicial perspective. To illustrate this
difference in expectations, let me hypothesize a highly improbable
situation.
Let us suppose that I have been designated by the Chief Justice
to sit as a U.S. district court judge for the purpose of hearing an
emergency petition for relief. The petition is brought against three
U.S. government defendants: the legislative branch, meaning
67. Id. at 1192 n.137.
68. Id. at 1193.
69. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 33.
70. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT (2009).
71. MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008).
72. Id. at 49-78; see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Hold Up and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1992 (2006) (discussing the fact that products in some industries
can be covered by many different patents).
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Congress; the executive branch, in particular, the USPTO; and the
judicial branch, in particular, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (collectively, the "Government"). The plaintiffs in this
hypothetical action are Professors Bessen, Burk, Lemley, and
Meurer, supported by a large number of amicus briefs, including
ones from Professors Craig Nard and John Duffy,73 the latter group
all members of the professoriate in support of the plaintiffs' case.
As I understand the pleadings, plaintiffs seek an injunction and
unspecified, but substantial, damages. The injunction, if granted,
would order the defendants to fix the variety of problems that
plaintiffs allege pervades the American patent system. The plaintiffs
also ask that the injunction invalidate all decisions of the courts that
are inconsistent with the views expressed by plaintiffs in their
pleadings and papers, including their extensive academic writings,
which are incorporated by reference. The damages awarded are to be
sequestered to pay for research and publication of more books and
papers by the plaintiffs. (The plaintiffs leave open whether the sweep
of the injunction should cover their future writings as well.)
The plaintiffs move for summary judgment on the grounds that
their case is so obviously correct that they should be granted
judgment as a matter of law. The Government has moved to dismiss
on the grounds that this action raises only political questions
assigned by the Constitution to the other branches of government,
and therefore is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. And in any
event, says the Government, the suit does not state a claim for which
relief can be granted.
I will first take up the Government's motion to dismiss. For
purposes of deciding the Government's motion to dismiss, I must
take the well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint,
including the extensive materials incorporated by reference, as true.
For the record, and to avoid any recusal motions, I hereby disavow
any of my previous views on the subjects before us, expressed by me
in anything I may have said or written.
What are the allegations made by the plaintiffs and their amici?
These are contained in a number of sources, and are many, but if we
focus just on the recent books, we are dealing with hundreds of pages
73. See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle,
101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619 (2007). But see S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent
Law's Uniformity Principle: A Response to Nard andDufLfy, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1735 (2007).
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of, dare I say, densely written material. I will summarize what I
understand to be the essence of the complaints:
* There are too many patents.
* There is a continuing decline in patent quality.
* There are too many issued patents containing claims that
are poorly drafted, overly broad, and difficult to
understand. Whether this result is inadvertent or
intentional, such claims fail to provide clear and efficient
notice of the boundaries of the rights granted.
* The USPTO has an unmanageable backlog of
applications and the patent-continuations practice is
abused.
* There should (or should not) be post-grant review of
patents.
* Litigation is too expensive and takes too long.
* Patent trolls are ensnaring real innovators who might
inadvertently cross the boundaries of a troll's patent.
* Patents may be called "property," but they fall far short of
any idealized notion of property rights.
* The problems with the patent notice function are
widespread and deep.
* A "unitary" patent law does not work in this day when
our major industries are as diverse as pharmaceuticals and
information technology. Patent law must be tailored to the
new technologies if it is to effectively promote
innovation.
* There is a perceived lack of determinacy in patent law.
And with regard, specifically, to the Federal Circuit, the
complaint makes the following allegations:
* The court is unable to render certain and predictable
decisions.
* The court does not follow its own precedents, and thus its
decisions are panel-dependent.
* The court's excessively high reversal rates create
uncertainty about the value of trial court decisions, and
trial court resources are wasted on a court that does not
give proper deference to the trial judge.
* Although the court professes to seek bright-line rules, the
results are confusion and uncertainty.
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* In short, the court has failed to deal with these
fundamental problems in the system by failing to exercise
its policy levers, and the result is a patent system that is
broken or in crisis.
Though the Government in its defense to these allegations does
not quite say so, it seems safe to say that the parties basically agree
on this much: Congress has fallen short in its duties to the patent
system and to the innovators and industries affected by the system.
Admittedly, there have been congressional patches and fixes added
from time to time, but despite tremendous economic and
technological changes since enactment of the 1952 Patent Act,
Congress has failed to significantly update the Act to reflect these
changes.
In the past several years, Congress has had before it proposals to
bring the Patent Act more into accord with what some see as modem
needs, and it has failed to do so.74 I do not think I run the risk of
summary reversal by the Court of Appeals if I hold that it is time for
Congress to stop dithering and face up to its responsibilities under
the Constitution "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."7 5 But how much further can I go?
Could I, in my capacity as designated district court judge in this
suit, issue the sought-after injunction, ordering Congress to pass
appropriate legislation or else find itself in contempt of court?
Perhaps I should have the U.S. Marshals take the congressional
leadership into custody until they comply?
Most legal authorities would say that the enactment of new laws,
no matter how badly needed, is basically a matter for Congress and
the U.S. President because it is a political act delegated by the
Constitution to the elected branches and thus not one within the
purview of the courts. That proposition is largely undisputed.
Perhaps less well accepted, at least among some critics, is the
extension of that thought beyond formal legislation. The extension
would say that the conscious exercise of so-called judicial "policy
levers," intended to change the basic operation of the system, is also
74. For the status of the currently pending patent reform legislation, see Press Release,
Leahy, Sessions, Hatch, Schumer, Kyl, Kaufman Unveil Details of Patent Reform Legislation
(Mar. 4, 2010), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press-releases/ (announcing proposed
agreement on changes to S. 515, 11lth Cong. (2009)).
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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a political act; to the extent discernable policies already are contained
in legislation, modification of those policies is exclusively the
province of the elected branches.
Since I see some validity in both the accepted narrow purview of
the court, as well as the extension of that view to policy levers, I am
persuaded that I must grant the Government's motion to dismiss the
complaint as it applies to Congress.
The same problem exists with judicial intrusion into the policy
choices and administration of the system as they are found in the
executive branch, acting through the USPTO. That, of course, does
not preclude courts from correcting actions of the USPTO that are
challenged in a properly brought law suit, assuming, of course, that
the USPTO's decision under review is in violation of some legal
standard and not simply a lack of political will to do what is
necessary to make the system work better. Of course, the ability of
the USPTO to do what is necessary is hindered by the agency's lack
of any substantive rulemaking authority; but there again, the decision
to leave the USPTO as one of the few major executive agencies to be
so impaired is for Congress to make. Thus, and for the same reasons,
I should either also dismiss the USPTO from this action, or at a
minimum, find that the complaint fails to state a claim for which
relief can be granted.
That leaves only the complaint against the courts, specifically
the Federal Circuit. Before we delve into the policy levers the court
has available to it, and the consequences of the court's failure to
employ them creatively, there is an important distinction to be made.
We must remember that we are dealing here with a court of appeals,
not with the Supreme Court. Just because most patent appeals end at
the circuit court level does not mean that the court of appeals is just
like a junior supreme court. Let me explain.
As much as some academics and media folk love to extol or
condemn the Supreme Court and its decisions and its pervasive role
in society, the rest of the judicial branch-the "inferior courts," as
the Constitution refers to us,76 the courts that carry the vast bulk of
the federal judicial workload-have a much different perspective on
judicial life. The Supreme Court reports only to the Constitution and
76. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.").
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God, not necessarily in that order. And they get to pick and choose
the issues about which they want to opine, and how many cases in a
year with which they want to deal.
The "inferior courts," including the thirteen courts of appeals,
operate in a very different judicial world. In addition to the
Constitution and the constraints imposed by Supreme Court
precedent, most cases that come to us are cabined by the elaborate
statutory framework Congress provides on just about every subject
that gets litigated in federal courts, including, of course, the entirety
of Title 35 of the U.S. Code dealing with patents. Common law
courts in the great English tradition we are not. Furthermore, the
cases come to these lower courts in a random, undifferentiated
manner, in sometimes overwhelming numbers over which the courts
have little, if any, say.
But that does not detract from the plaintiffs' well-pleaded
allegations to the effect that we need significant improvement in the
functioning of the American patent system. Let us further accept that
neither Congress nor the executive branch seem to have the will or
the way to bring about that change. Why then will the courts not do
it?
Let us take as an example an issue that we might all agree is
worthy of examination: the question of whether patent law should be
tailored to the needs of specific industries. For example, can there be
a robust and well-defined body of patent law supporting innovation
in the pharmaceutical industry over the long periods of time it takes
to bring new products to the market, while at the same time a
somewhat different body of patent law providing rules with
sufficient flexibility and adaptability so as not to interfere with the
constantly changing dynamics of invention in the software and
computer industry? "
How would or could a court go about addressing that question?
The first step would be to have the issue brought before the
court in a focused and cohesive way. The Constitution could be a
problem here, because it states that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend
to . . . Cases ... [and] . . . Controversies."7 8 Admittedly, how to tailor
77. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002). But see R. Polk Wagner, OfPatents and Path Dependency: A
Comment on Burk and Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1341 (2003).
78. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2.
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patent law to specific industries would certainly be a controversy, but
that may not be exactly what the Constitution means.
We would need to find parties to a lawsuit willing to focus their
attention on the larger policy issues and not necessarily just on
winning their case. The case would have to be one that clearly raised
the issue and on which the outcome turned, so that the court's
decision would not simply be dicta and thus nonbinding. And we
would have to be sure that we could muster enough judges willing to
manipulate those policy levers and not just decide the case.
A second step would be to ensure that the court obtains adequate
information about the issues, how different industries would be
affected, and what specific alternatives there are to changes in
doctrine and practice that would achieve the desired results. Perhaps
the court could announce a series of public hearings on the case and
invite experts from industry and academia to give testimony. Amicus
briefs could be invited, though that raises the question of whether, in
the interest of fairness, we would have to allow the amici to file reply
briefs in response to each other. Presumably the case would have to
be decided by the full court sitting en banc, but those who have
observed the court en banc might have qualms about that.
In addition to these constitutional, statutory, and practical
obstacles to the flexing of the court's policy levers, culture is also a
key question. Having spent much of my professional life in the
academy while teaching at several different law schools, I am
familiar with the culture and traditions of that life-the importance
of scholarly publication and the dedication to teaching; the need to
be creative in one's research and writing; and the value of peer
recognition and the usefulness of intellectual interchange at
conferences and symposia held at the many law schools. The
freedom to intellectually innovate, to choose what one wants to think
about, and to reach beyond the customary and the accepted is central
to the role of the academic.
Having now spent almost as much time on the court as I did in
academia, I have come to understand that the culture of the courts-
of judges-is quite different." The courts take seriously their role in
the peaceful resolution of specific disputes. At the appellate level, the
79. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008) (offering an inside
perspective on the judicial branch).
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cases come to us in defined form and substance, defined in great
detail by another forum, and our opinions are expected to respond
and be confined to the arguments and issues presented by the parties'
advocates. When a court strays into territory of its own choosing, it
opens itself to justified criticism.
The purpose of publishing an opinion usually is not to challenge
one's peers to think more broadly or to break new and unexplored
ground." Rather, it is a response to the received materials in the
briefs and records; to the extent new rules and doctrinal explications
emerge as a consequence of decision, so be it. Even then, the scope
of doctrinal explication today is largely constrained by statute and
precedent. The days of the Cardozos and Learned Hands, the great
common law judges who looked across an empty landscape and
filled it with creative imagination, are hard to replicate in a world of
seemingly unlimited legislative volubility; the occasional judge who
tries usually gets overruled.
This is not to say that, even today, judges-including judges
below the Supreme Court-do not make law. Yes, there are notable
occasions on which a court such as ours has undertaken to engage in
significant doctrinal modification. But it is important to appreciate
the kinds of issues the court has felt free to address in that manner. A
court of appeals is quite willing to decide questions about who in the
judicial system should decide what and by what standards. Examples
of such decisions are Markman " and In re Seagate Technology,
LLC.82 And courts are familiar with the practice of applying
established rules to different factual circumstances to reach different
results. But that is not the same as crafting different rules to be
applied differently to different cases, nor does it speak to the broader
question of how and in what ways innovation and invention should
be promoted and protected in the society.
To summarize, then, regarding the institutional role of the
Federal Circuit in addressing the array of problems in the American
80. But see Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 605 F.3d 1347, 1347-49 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(Plager, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing) (urging the court to reexamine its
indefiniteness jurisprudence).
81. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),
(holding that claim construction is a question for the court, not the jury), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370
(1996).
82. 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (overruling prior precedent to hold that
proof of willful infringement requires at least a showing of objective recklessness).
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patent system, one must ask: Does appellate litigation lend itself to
addressing, and solving, the basic problems in the patent system? Not
without substantial modification in the way cases are brought, how
they are developed at the trial level, and how they are presented and
argued. This would require a conscious decision by all involved-the
litigants, the trial lawyers, the trial court judge, the jury (if there is
one), the appellate lawyers, and the appellate court judges-to
cooperate in framing an agreed policy issue and to preserve it all the
way through the appeal. This is certainly a challenging prospect.
Could the Federal Circuit act more like the Supreme Court,
seeking and finding the cases that present the big policy questions?
The court could identify the questions it is interested in and solicit
cases raising these questions. As cases come up, whether the parties
adequately understood or raised the right issues, the court could call
for further briefing by the parties and invite amici.
Like the Supreme Court, the court's opinions would have to be
free of the usual constraints. The facts would be the starting point,
but not necessarily a restriction on the scope of the decision; dicta
would be good law; multiple opinions in any one case would be the
rule (something we already seem to be doing on occasion). It would
be expected that the judges would line up squarely by understood
policy preferences; perhaps the media and the press would become
interested; and the judges might author something other than
compilations of cases-they could even write books about their
judicial philosophy.
All of this is possible, but it would take some doing. For one
thing, we would have to re-educate the judges away from deciding
cases to deciding instead how the patent system should work and
why. Admittedly, some judges might like that, but it would subject
the others to possible criticism from their peers in the other courts. It
might even require a whole different panel of judges, possibly all
made up of former academics, and preferably also former law
clerks." And on a positive note, perhaps Congress or the President
might take more interest in their responsibilities to the patent system
if we really showed them what could be done.
83. This may not be entirely farfetched. See Scott A. Herbst & Antigone G. Peyton, 19 FED.
clR. B.J. 509, 511-12 (2010) (remarking on the number of potential vacancies the court will have
in the ensuing years).
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However, if I had to decide this case now, as my hypothetical
proposes, for all the many reasons suggested I would have to grant
the Government's motion; the suit against the Federal Circuit is
dismissed. The plaintiffs have sixty days to file their appeal-with
the Federal Circuit.
CONCLUSION
In this essay, I have addressed two separate aspects of the
Federal Circuit in its institutional role in the federal court system-
the role of the Federal Circuit in dealing with the problem of
uncertainty in patent law, and more specifically, the court's handling
of the patent claiming and claim construction processes; and the role
of the Federal Circuit with regard to its so-called "policy levers" and
its ostensible failure to effectively exercise them.
With regard to the problem of uncertainty in patent law doctrine,
there can be found in the several articles submitted in this
symposium a number of suggestions for improvement, some within
and some beyond the court's reach. Much more could, and probably
should, be said about this. Perhaps a later symposium devoted
primarily to this topic is warranted.
With regard to the "policy levers" debate and whether the
exceptional aspects of the Federal Circuit's structural position (which
I described at the beginning of the essay) have caused the court to
fall notably short in its performance, as its critics claim it has, there
seems to me to be a thread that ties together the "policy levers"
debate and the disagreements over the court's success as an
institution. Deciding cases is clearly the central role of a court at
every level; the Federal Circuit is no exception. However, as the
commentators emphasize, for an appellate court, there is also the
need to deal with the synthesis of doctrine and, especially in the
federal system, the complexities of statutory interpretation both for
the case at issue and for later cases that may arise under the statutory
framework.
Analytically, these two functional roles of an appellate court-
deciding the case and "managing the jurisprudence," to use Professor
Wagner's expression-can be separately described; operationally,
they merge and blend. In some cases, the applicable law and the right
result may require no more explanation than a few sentences; in
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other cases, the explanation for the agreed result can be the more
difficult task.
A court's explanatory style may be primarily formalistic: the
appropriate legal rules are parsed and their application to the facts
described, the precedents are shown as controlling or distinguishable,
and the conclusion is presented as a matter of virtually unavoidable
logic. Policy is invoked, if at all, by demonstrating consistency with
established law.
An alternative explanation might be based on identifying what
are taken to be the underlying policies (economic, social, and
political, to name a few) raised by the issues in the case, and
explicating how the decision contributes to the realization of the
posited policy goals. Rules of law and precedents are extolled or
rejected depending on their contribution to the analysis.
As I explained with reference to the situation-sense concept,
when a single "right" outcome in a patent case is precluded by
ambiguity, either inherent or constructed, neither of these styles
accurately reflects the interior process of judging. Perhaps some of
the criticism regarding the court's "failure" to use its policy levers is
a reflection of the critics' desire to have the court openly address the
policy questions rather than have them kept out of sight. It is worth
noting that readers who turn to the minority views found in some of
the Federal Circuit's opinions-a form of judicial expression
currently in vogue-may sometimes get a sense for the underlying
policy disputes, even if such disputes are not visible in the majority's
version.
Should the judges of the Federal Circuit, in addition to reciting
the law, also explicitly articulate the underlying policies that present
themselves in any particular case? Assuming such policies are both
visible and describable, such explicit articulation presumably would
illuminate the extent to which such considerations are at work, rather
than leave the focus on the doctrinal explanation for the outcome.
Whether that would improve the decisional process or only change
the nature of the debate about it is not all that clear. And for the
reasons I discussed above, to make a wholesale shift to this form of
opinion writing might require a departure from tradition that would
challenge this and any circuit court's ability or desire, even assuming
advocates before the court could be trained accordingly.
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That, however, may not be a sufficient reason to ignore the
question. As is often the case, there may be room for a middle
ground between these extremes, and one would not be surprised to
find variability on the treatment of this question in the opinions that
have been, and are currently being issued, by the court. This
symposium and the articles included in this issue make a significant
contribution to patent law literature by bringing into focus the
interesting questions that surround the institutional roles of the
several players in the patent game.
